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Abstract 
 
The software protection strategy of software developer and the inherent risk to end user in 
using pirated software are two major factors that affect a user’s decision on whether to 
purchase or pirate a software product.  This paper analyzes the optimal protection strategy 
for software developer in horizontally and vertically differentiated markets.  We find that the 
implementation cost of software protection constitutes the primary factor for software 
developers to determine their software protection strategies.  However, in a vertically 
differentiated market, the lower quality product should always adopt a non-protection 
strategy, regardless of the protection implementation cost.  In other cases, protection would 
only be optimal if the protection implementation cost to the software developer is relatively 
small.  These findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence. 
 
Keywords: Software piracy, software protection strategy, horizontal differentiation, 
vertical differentiation 
 
1. Introduction 
According to a global report by Business Software Alliance (2003), the software 
industry is said to have lost more than $13.08 billion in business during the year 2002 due to 
software piracy.  It remains to be one of the most well known and persistent problems of the 
IT industry.  It is estimated that an average of 39% of all software installed in 2002 were 
pirated versions (Business Software Alliance 2003). In fact, the situation is deteriorating with 
the rapid and pervasive application of IT in the modern society. 
At the first glance, one may perceive software piracy as just another example of the 
illegal duplication of other intellectual properties like books, journals, or media contents. 
However, there are at least two factors that make software piracy a unique type of problem in 
itself.  Firstly, software developers are able to implement protection codes or mechanisms 
that can effectively and significantly increase the difficulty to pirate. Such measures are 
usually not available to publishers and producers.  The protection of software products can 
range from the use of hardware “dongles” to just requiring the user to enter a cryptic product 
key code. Although one may argue that these schemes are usually not unbreakable, they 
increase the cost for pirates to use illegal copies of software.  Of course, the software 
developer would also need to pay a certain implementation cost for this type of software 
protection mechanisms.  Secondly, there are inherent risks in using pirated software.  These 
risks are unique to the software industry and make software piracy quite different from other 
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forms of illegal duplication of intellectual properties.  For instance, due to the unlawful nature 
of piracy, the quality of pirated software can never be guaranteed.  Very often the pirated 
software would have already been infected with malicious computer virus before it arrives at 
the hands of the end user.   
Also, software is seldom free of defects.  Some defects not only result in 
malfunctioning of the software but also leave “vulnerabilities” for malicious computer 
hackers to exploit.  Very often these defects would only be discovered after the consumer has 
purchased and used the software for a certain period of time.  It is a common practice for 
software developers to provide post-sale technical support to the legitimate users should there 
be any subsequent problems.  While these types of technical support may exist in a variety of 
forms, ranging from security patches, features updates, to email or even telephone support, 
they are usually available only to the paying consumers but not to the pirates.  Users of 
pirated software are at their own risk.  It is reasonable to assume that some people would be 
deterred from pirating in view of this risk. 
Cheng et al (1997) attempted to exhaustively enlist the reasons behind people’s 
software purchasing or pirating decisions in an empirical study.  In particular, they found 
“technical support in case of problems” as well as “worry about computer viruses” to be 
among the ten most important reasons for people to purchase, rather than pirate software.  
In the Internet age, the risk of using vulnerable software cannot be overemphasized.  
The US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database (US-CERT 2004) lists many popular software 
products that contain critical security vulnerabilities.  For example, the various “buffer 
overrun” vulnerabilities that exist in the popular Oracle 9i product would require software 
updates available only to registered users.  In principle, users of pirated copies of Oracle 9i 
would have to bear the risk of future attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities, especially if 
their systems are connected to the Internet.  The risk in using pirated software became quite 
apparent in the recent “Blaster” attack.  “Blaster” was an Internet virus that exploited a 
known vulnerability of the Windows XP software.  A timely patch to this vulnerability was 
actually released by the vendor but was made available only to registered customers.  As a 
result, machines running pirated copies of Windows XP were forced to disconnect from the 
Internet to prevent from getting exposed to the virus attack.   
To summarize, both the software protection mechanism and the risk in using pirated 
software serve to reduce piracy.  The former is mainly a preventive measure that is available 
to the software developer who needs to weigh the cost and benefit before deciding on what 
type of protection mechanism, if any, should be adopted.  The latter can be considered a 
deterrent means that is beyond the control of any single party.  The effect of risk may depend 
on a number of factors such as the chance of virus infection through the use of pirated 
software, the ultimate reliability of the software product3, etc.  In this paper, we attempt to 
study the optimal protection strategies for software firms in a duopoly software market, with 
the explicit consideration of the potential risk in using pirated software due to the lack of 
technical support.  We develop an analytic model that assumes that people can overcome the 
software protection by bearing a cost of pirating.  Users are heterogeneous in the cost of 
pirating.  We will also model the risk in using pirated software in our framework. 
We consider a duopoly market under two forms of product differentiation: horizontal 
and vertical (Tirole 1988). By horizontal differentiation, we mean that software firms 
compete with each other by designing features that are unique from its competitor.  On the 
                                                 
3 In this study, we assume that software developers would not intentionally reduce the reliability of their software products 
for the purpose of deterring piracy. 
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other hand, in a vertically differentiated market, firms compete in the quality of their products.  
Our main objective is to analyze the optimal protection strategies for software firms under 
each situation.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  To begin with, we will examine 
the relevant prior research in the area of software piracy first.  We will then develop an 
analytical model conforming to our observations mentioned above.  In particular, we will 
analyze the problem using two well known market competition paradigms, namely the 
horizontally differentiated market and the vertically differentiated one.  
  
2. Background Literature 
Intuitively thinking, the existence of piracy should reduce demand and thus profit.  It 
follows that the best strategy for software firms would be to increase the protection level as 
much as possible so that potential pirates would simply find it very costly to pirate.  However, 
Conner & Rumelt (1991) argue that by taking into account the effect of network externalities, 
as commonly found in software products, a high level of protection may not be optimal for 
firms.  They show that in a monopoly setting, raising software protection would be profit-
maximizing only when there is only insignificant effect of network externalities.  Otherwise, 
profit would decrease with an increased protection level because some would-be pirates are 
forced to do without the software, rather than buying it.  However, the model used does not 
consider strategic interactions in a competitive market as well as the inherent risk in using 
pirated software.  
The work by Shy & Thisse (1999) further develops the analysis of optimal software 
protection strategy by the use of a horizontally differentiated duopoly model. Their findings 
are similar to those by Conner & Rumelt in that when externalities effects are strong, non-
protection would be optimal for competing software firms.  Their model assumes 
dichotomization in two dimensions.  Firstly, consumers are dichotomized into support-
oriented or support-independent ones.  Support-oriented users choose to buy rather than 
pirate if the price of software is less than the utility they derive from the support service.  
Secondly, rather than treating the level of protection level as a continuous variable, firm’s 
protection strategies are dichotomized into either full protection or nil protection.  This 
conforms to the reality in that software products usually come only with a simple protection 
mechanism that checks for a valid product key, or are just completely unprotected. 
However, their model also assumes that end users would have no way to use pirated 
software if software protection is in place.  Unfortunately this is often not true in real life.  In 
fact, end users can usually obtain pirated software with protection mechanism already 
compromised.  Also, most of the time software is only protected by a product key code that 
can be easily duplicated.  Therefore, we believe that it should be more realistic to assume that 
people can still pirate even though a software product is protected, only that they would need 
to pay a cost of pirating.  The cost for pirating can differ by individual but in general should 
be small compared with the price of software. 
The dichotomization of support-oriented and support-independent consumers does not 
fully represent the inherent risk in using pirated software as discussed previously.  In Shy & 
Thisse’s model, technical support only brings a fixed amount of utility to support-oriented 
users.  However, we believe the lack of technical support would introduce a risk that 
essentially discounts, in the sense of expected utility, the benefits derivable from using the 
pirated software. 
The concept of risk in using pirated software was first used by Banerjee (2003) in his 
analysis of the software piracy problem from the perspective of social welfare and 
government policy.  In his model, end user simply cannot be certain that a piece of software 
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obtained from illegal sources would indeed work as expected.  However, his focus was 
mainly on governmental monitoring of counterfeiting business. 
We believe that the concept of risk is not only applicable to cases when end user 
purchase software from pirates, but also to cases when end users make illegal copies of 
licensed software themselves.  In fact, as pointed out earlier, the study by Cheng et al (1997) 
reveals that there are other risks in using pirated software, such as the lack of technical 
support in case of problems and computer viruses. In the following, market competition, 
dichotomization of software protection level, as well as the risk in using pirated software will 
be incorporated into our analytical model. 
 
3. Horizontal Differentiation 
We start with the horizontally differentiated market setting.  Namely, we consider the 
case when competing software firms aim at the same application area (e.g. symbolic 
computation, graphics design, web authoring, etc.) but produce software with features 
differentiated from each other.  Moreover, each consumer would value each of these 
differentiated features differently.   
For example, consider the desktop operating systems provided by Apple Computer 
and that by Microsoft.  Both operating systems are designed to provide an easy-to-use 
graphical user interface for end users to manage their personal computers.  However, some of 
the features they provide are unique from each other and these differentiated features are 
valued differently by different camps of consumers. 
For simplicity, we model the market as a duopoly and represent the heterogeneity in 
consumers’ preferences for the two different software products using the “linear city” model 
(Hotelling 1929).  In the real software market, very often there would be an innovator firm at 
the beginning, followed by a number of other software developers who believe it would be 
profitable to sell similar products in the same application area.  However, due to fierce 
market competition among software developers, usually only a few major players might 
remain when the market becomes stable.  Such a phenomenon of market consolidation can be 
found in many application areas such as productivity tools, graphics packages, etc.  We thus 
believe that our duopoly model represents an acceptable approximation of reality.  We denote 
the two competing products software 1 (sw1) and software 2 (sw2) respectively.  
 
3.1. The Firms 
Before the software is actually developed, the firm would decide on whether to 
implement any protection mechanism against unauthorized copying.  As discussed earlier, a 
dichotomization of protection strategy should be more appropriate than a continuous level of 
protection because software products nowadays are usually shipped with protection by simple 
checking of product key code, or without any protection at all. We denote their decisions on 
protection strategies by {0,1}iη ∈  ( 1,2i = ) where 0iη =  means firm i  has chosen not to 
implement protection.  However, if a firm chooses to implement protection ( 1iη = ), an 
implementation cost k  would be incurred.   
Once the firms decide on their protection strategies, they also need to decide the 
selling price of their software ip  ( 1, 2i = ).  It is assumed that firms would act rationally and 
The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006) 
 
 126
choose their respective optimal prices to maximize their own profits.  Assuming a zero 
marginal cost of production for simplicity, the profit of a firm is given by: 
i i i ip d kπ η= −          ….. (1) 
where id  denotes the demand of the software in concern.  In order to determine the optimal 
price, a firm needs to anticipate the possible reactions of both its competitor and the potential 
consumers, as detailed in the following. 
 
3.2. The Consumers 
We will assume full participation by consumers in that all consumers either buy or 
pirate one of the software.  There are two main factors, namely benefit and cost, affecting the 
utility a consumer may derive from using a piece of software: 
Benefit The benefit of software would depend on the intrinsic quality of it as well as 
how its features match the preferences of the user.  A piece of software that is highly 
regarded by one user may not appear to be that useful to another.  In our model for 
horizontally differentiated market, the intrinsic software quality is assumed to be the same for 
both firms and is denoted by q .  On the other hand, consumers are ranked by their 
preferences of sw1 to sw2, with their relative preference positions denoted by [0,1]x ∈ .  
Namely, a consumer with a smaller x  would prefer sw1 more to sw2.  Considering the 
deterioration in benefit due to preference mismatch, we model the benefit of sw1 to a 
consumer at position x  by q tx−  where t  denotes the benefit degradation factor (i.e. the 
“transportation cost”) due to preference mismatch.  Similarly, the benefit of sw2 would be 
(1 )q t x− −  to the same consumer. 
Cost  The cost would simply be the selling price of the software in case a consumer 
purchases it.  Prices are denoted by 1p  and 2p  for sw1 and sw2 respectively.  In the case of 
pirating protected software, a cost for pirating would also be incurred.  It is assumed that this 
cost would depend on individual’s characteristics (e.g. technical know-how, available 
resources for pirating, etc.) but would be more or less similar across different target software 
to be pirated. As such, the consumer’s cost for pirating is modeled to be heterogeneous 
among consumers but the same for both sw1 and sw2.  For simplicity, we define the cost for 
pirating as zτ   where τ  is the homogeneous scaling factor of piracy costs while [0,1]z ∈  
denotes the consumer’s heterogeneity in pirating protected software.  Essentially, some 
consumers pay a higher cost than others to pirate a piece of protected software.   
As a result, the utility 1bU  and 2bU  derived from purchasing sw1 and sw2 would be: 
1 1bU q tx p= − −         ….. (2) 
2 2(1 )bU q t x p= − − −         ….. (3) 
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As mentioned before, users of pirated software are all subject to risk. We may express this 
risk factor by the expected benefit of using a pirated software copy. Assuming a risk factor of 
(0,1)φ ∈ , the utility 1pU  and 2pU  for pirating sw1 and sw2 would respectively be: 
1 1(1 )( )pU q tx zφ τ η= − − −        ….. (4) 
2 2(1 )( (1 ))pU q t x zφ τ η= − − − −       ….. (5) 
Namely, 1 φ−  is the probability that the pirated software would work perfectly. 
 
3.3.  The Market 
Having introduced the essential characteristics of software firms and consumers, we 
are about to incorporate the two in a competitive market.  Namely, we consider a competitive 
market in a three-stage non-cooperative game.  In stage 1, software firms set their respective 
protection strategies 1 2( , )η η .  In stage 2, firms determine their optimal prices 1 2( , )p p  with 
the expectation that their profits would be maximized.  Lastly in stage 3, consumers choose 
whether to buy or pirate either one of the software so as to maximize their utilities.  The game, 
in its extensive form, can be illustrated in Figure 1.  
We will study the problem using the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) 
concept.  That is, both firms would first anticipate the utility-maximizing decisions of 
consumers that would happen at stage 3.  Based on this anticipation and also considering the 
profit-maximizing behavior of its competitor, a firm determines its profit-maximizing price 
under the 4 possible protection strategies, namely 1 2( 1, 1)η η= = , 1 2( 1, 0)η η= = , 
1 2( 0, 1)η η= =  and 1 2( 0, 0)η η= = .  Lastly, by comparing the maximized profits at each 
different protection strategy, the two firms set their optimal protection strategies at stage 1 
based on the Nash Equilibrium concept.  Before proceeding with the analysis, the utility 
function of the consumer is restated as follows: 
1
1
2
2
                                
(1 )( )                 
(1 )                         
(1 )( (1 ))         
q tx p
q tx zU q t x p
q t x z
φ τ η
φ τ η
− −⎧⎪ − − −= ⎨ − − −⎪ − − − −⎩
   
1
1
2
2
if buy    
if pirate 
if buy    
if pirate 
sw
sw
sw
sw
      ….. (6) 
while the profit functions of the two firms are given by: 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
p d k
p d k
π ηπ η= −= −           ….. (7) 
 
The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006) 
 
 128
 
Figure 1:   Game Tree 
One may easily note from (6) and (7) the dynamics of such a market.  Firstly, by 
setting protection level and price, a firm is affecting the decisions of consumers on whether to 
buy or pirate sw1 or sw2.  Such decisions would in turn affect the demands for sw1 and sw2.  
Finally, the profits of firms are actually determined by the demands for their software, as can 
be seen from (7).  To continue our analysis, we will first study the demands for sw1 and sw2 
that result from the utility-maximizing behavior of consumers. 
 
3.4. Demand and Profit at Equilibrium 
We will consider the demand of sw1 first.  To start with, let us focus on the effect of 
x  on the consumer’s utility and leave the effect of z  alone for the time being.  Figure 2 
shows the utility functions for purchasing and for pirating sw1 at each fixed value of z .  
Firstly, all utility functions of the consumer are linear in x .  For sw1, the utilities of the two 
choices (i.e. buying or pirating) would simply be represented by the two downward-sloping 
straight lines 1bU  and 1pU .  In particular, the slope for buying is t−  whereas that for pirating 
is (1 )tφ− − .  As φ  must be within the interval (0,1) , 1bU  would always be steeper than 1pU .  
From Figure 2, it can be easily seen that consumers in the range 1 1(0, )b px  would prefer 
buying to pirating sw1 while those in the range 1 1( ,1)b px  would prefer pirating to buying. 
We can now consider the effect of z  on the demand.  It can be seen from (6) that 
different values of z  would result in different intercepts of the pirating utility, as shown in 
Figure 3.   
Note that the intersection point 1 1b px  would also be changing with z .  Considering z , 
the indifference point 1 1b px  becomes a line of indifference between buying and pirating sw1.  
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1
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The consumer’s utility functions 1bU  and 1pU  become 2-dimensional planes in the 3-
dimensional space of ( , , )U x z .  The demand for sw1 is simply the projection, on the ( , )x z  
plane, of the region where the plane 1bU  is the highest.  Essentially this area is outlined by the 
indifference line 1 1b px  with respect to z  within the interval [0,1]z ∈ .  
 
  
   Figure 2:   Utilities of Buying and Pirating sw1    Figure 3:   Effect of z on demand 
More generally, we can derive the utility-maximizing demands for software from the 
appropriate lines of indifference, as will be shown later.  It should be noted that 1bU  and 1pU  
may not necessarily intersect within the interval of (0,1)x = . This could happen when the 
vertical intercept of 1pU  is larger than that of 1bU , and in this case pirating would always 
undercut buying.  We would not further analyze this case because the firm will doubtlessly 
need to lower its price or abandon the market as no consumer is buying the product.  On the 
other hand, 1bU  and 1pU  would also not intersect when the value of 1pU  is smaller than that 
of 1bU  when 1x = .  In this case, buying would always undercut pirating.  Again, we would 
not further analyze this case because there is actually no issue of piracy under such a situation. 
We may now consider the situation when sw2 is also put in the picture.  Considering 
the 2-dimensional space of ( , )U x , the utility functions 2bU  and 2pU  would simply be two 
lines having slopes t  and (1 )tφ−  respectively, as shown in Figure 4. 
0 1
x
U
Up1
xb1p1 
Ub1
0 1
x
U
Up1 (z=0)
xb1p1 (z=0) 
Ub1
xb1p1 (z=1) 
Up1 (z=1)
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We are only interested in the situation when there are non-zero portions of users 
buying and pirating sw1 or sw2.  This is equivalent to the following assumption that posits the 
relations among the intersecting points: 
2 2 1 2 1 11> 0      [0,1]b p p p b px x x z> > > ∀ ∈      ….. (C1)  
Now we can consider the 3-dimensional space of ( , , )U x z .  As explained previously, 
the demands for sw1 and sw2 can be derived from the indifference lines 1 1b px  and 2 2b px .   In 
other words, the demands would simply be the projections on the ( , )x z  plane as shown in 
Figure 5.  Based on the utility functions of the consumer as given by (6), the demands for sw1 
and sw2 are:  
1
1 1
1 1 1
0
2 21
2b p
p qd x dz
t
τη φ
φ
− += =∫          ….. (8) 
1
2 2
2 2 2
0
2 2 211 1
2b p
p q td x dz
t
τη φ φ
φ
− + −= − = +∫        ….. (9) 
 
 
   Figure 4:   Utilities of Buying and Pirating             Figure 5:   Demand 
That is, the utility-maximizing demands are now entirely in terms of other model parameters, 
namely the exogenous q , φ , t  and τ  as well as the endogenous 1p , 2p , 1η  and 2η . 
Similarly, by substituting the anticipated second-stage demands into (7), the firms’ profit 
functions 1π  and 2π  can be expressed entirely in terms of the exogenous q , φ , t , τ  and k  
as well as the endogenous 1p , 2p , 1η  and 2η .   
Since firms need to determine optimal prices to maximize their profits, their problems 
would be: 
0 1
x
z 
1
xb1p1 
d1 
xb2p2 xp1p2 
d2 
0 1
x
Up1
Ub1
Up2
Ub2
xb1p1 xb2p2 xp1p2 
U
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1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
max max max 2 21
2
p qp d k p k
p p p t
τη φπ η ηφ
⎛ ⎞− += − = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠    ….. (10) 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
max max max 2 2 211
2
p q tp d k p k
p p p t
τη φ φπ η ηφ
⎛ ⎞− + −= − = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  ….. (11) 
Proposition 14: In a horizontally differentiated software market, protection would be 
optimal for both firms only if * ( 4 )
16
qk k
t
τ τ φ
φ
+< = .  Otherwise, non-protection would be 
optimal for both firms. 
Note that *k  is increasing in τ , the pirating cost.  Protection would be optimal only if 
the protection cost is below *k  which mainly consists of a square term of the pirating cost τ  
of the consumer.  This suggests that firms should prefer only a very simple and low-cost 
protection mechanism or no protection at all. 
As shown in the Appendix, the optimal prices, demands and profits of both firms 
should be symmetrical if they adopt the same protection strategy.  In case of protection, the 
optimal price, demand and profit should be * *1 2
2
4
qp p τ φ+= = , * *1 2 24
qd d
t
τ φ
φ
+= =  and 
2 2 2
* *
1 2
4 4 16
16
q q kt
t
τ τ φ φ φπ π φ
+ + −= =  respectively.  In case of non-protection, the optimal 
price, demand and profit would be * *1 2 2
qp p φ= = , * *1 2 2
qd d
t
= =  and 
2
* *
1 2 4
q
t
φπ π= =  
respectively.   
It follows that the optimal profit is increasing in q  but decreasing in t , regardless of 
whether protection is in place or not.  Namely, optimal profit increases when software is of 
higher quality but decreases when the negative effect of preference mismatch (i.e. the 
transportation cost) is high.  Also, when protection is in place, the optimal profit is also 
increasing in τ , the pirating cost on the consumer side.  These very much conform to 
intuition.   
Comparing the optimal prices and demands for protection and non-protection, it can 
be seen that the optimal prices and demands for non-protection would always be lower than 
those for protection.  In this sense, the protection cost contributes as the major determining 
factor for firms to adopt protection.  On the other hand, the effects of risk (i.e. φ ) on the 
optimal price, demand as well as profit are summarized in the following table of comparative 
statics: 
                                                 
4 Proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward and withheld due to length limitation.  Interested readers may obtain it from the 
authors directly. 
The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006) 
 
 132
 *
1p
φ
∂
∂  
*
2p
φ
∂
∂  
*
1d
φ
∂
∂  
*
2d
φ
∂
∂  
*
1π
φ
∂
∂  
*
2π
φ
∂
∂  
Both Protect +  +  −  −  ′+  ′+  
Both Not Protect +  +  0  0  +  +  
: positive if 2qτ φ′+ <  
In general, optimal prices and profits should increase with risk5.  It is also interesting to note 
that the optimal demands would decrease with risk in case of protection.  The intuition behind 
is that if the software is protected and the risk becomes higher, the firm can charge a higher 
price and reap a higher profit, although there are actually less buying consumers. 
 
4. Vertical Differentiation 
Having considered the case of horizontally differentiated market, we now consider the 
case when software products are vertically differentiated.  By vertical differentiation, we 
mean that software products compete in quality.  In general, the higher quality firm can sell at 
a higher price and also the preference for quality is assumed to be different across different 
consumers.   
Vertical differentiation is indeed quite common in the software industry.  Many 
popular software magazines and download sites (e.g. PC Magazine, Bytes, download.com, 
zdnet.com, etc.) offer ratings of software products in terms of a common set of criteria such 
as ease-of-use, functionalities, etc. to assist consumers in making their purchasing decisions.   
The main difference from the analysis of horizontal differentiation would be in the 
formulation of the consumer’s utility functions.  Namely, we denote the intrinsic qualities of 
sw1 and sw2 by 1q  and 2q  respectively.  Consumers are now ranked by their preferences to 
the quality of software, denoted by (0,1)θ ∈ , instead of by their preferences of product 
features (i.e. x ).  A consumer with a larger θ  would derive more utility from the quality of 
sw1 and sw2. As such, the benefits of sw1 and sw2 to a consumer θ  would be 1q θ  and 2q θ  
respectively.  Without loss of generosity, we assume 1 2q q> .  Therefore, the utility functions 
of the consumer are modified as follows: 
1 1
1 1
2 2
2 2
            
(1 )
           
(1 )
q p
q zU q p
q z
θ φ θ τ ηθφ θ τ η
−⎧⎪ − −= ⎨ −⎪ − −⎩
   
1
1
2
2
if buy    
if pirate 
if buy    
if pirate 
sw
sw
sw
sw
        ….. (12) 
where the definitions of 1 2 1 2, , , , ,p p zτ η η  remain the same as in horizontal differentiation. 
                                                 
5 The condition 2qτ φ<  is likely to be valid because the pirating cost should be significantly lower than the benefit of the 
software to make a case of software piracy. 
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         Figure 6:   Consumer’s Utility          Figure 7:   Demands 
Consider the consumer’s utility when pirating either sw1 or sw2.  From (12), it follows that the 
slope of consumer’s utility with respect to θ  when pirating sw1 would always be steeper than 
that of pirating sw2.  It can be easily seen that when 1 2( , )η η  is either (1,1) , (0,1)  or (0,0) , 
pirating sw1 would always dominate pirating sw2.  When 1 2( , ) (1,0)η η = ,  pirating sw2 may 
dominate pirating sw1 for some consumers.  Denote the point of indifference between pirating 
sw1 and sw2 as 1 2p pθ , it can be seen that no one would pirate sw2 unless 1 2 0p pθ > .   
Now consider the consumer’s utility when buying either software.  From (12), it is 
clear that the slope of consumer’s utility with respect to θ  when buying sw1 would always be 
steeper than that of buying sw2.  We assume that the point of indifference between buying sw1 
and buying sw2, denoted by 1 2b bθ , lies somewhere between 0  and 1  (i.e. 1 20 1b bθ< < ).  
(Without this assumption, buying either software would always dominate buying the other.)  
Consider the consumer’s utility with respect to θ  as shown in Figure 6.  Namely, 
there will be 4 groups of consumers.  Those with 1 2[ ,1]b bθ θ∈  would buy sw1 and those with 
1 2 1 2[ , ]p b b bθ θ θ∈  would buy sw2.  Moreover, those with 1 2 1 2[ , ]p p p bθ θ θ∈  would choose to 
pirate sw1 while those with 1 2[0, ]p pθ θ∈  (if 1 2( , ) (1,0)η η =  and 1 2 0p pθ > ) would choose to 
pirate sw2.  However, we assume that even though sw2 is unprotected, it can only convert a 
certain portion of consumers from pirating sw1 to pirating sw2, mainly because the pirating 
cost should be relatively small.  More formally, we assume the relations among the 
intersecting points to satisfy the following: 
1 2 1 2 2 21       [0,1]b b p b p b zθ θ θ> > > ∀ ∈       ….. (C2)  
0 1 θ 
θp1b2 θb1b2 1 z
d1 
d2 
0 1 θ 
U
θp1b2 θb1b2 θp2b2 
-p1 
-p2 
0 or 
τz
θp1p2 
Up2
Up1
Ub2
Ub1
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Intuitively, it implies that the price of sw1 is higher than that of sw2 and both prices are higher 
than the pirating cost.  Also, the risk of using pirated software is more significant than the 
quality difference between the products (i.e. 2 1(1 )q qφ> −  such that 2bU  is always steeper 
than 2pU ).   
Similar to our analysis on the horizontal differentiation case, the demands are given 
by the corresponding projections of the utility planes onto the ( , z) plane, as illustrated by 
the shaded areas in Figure 7.  Namely, the demands for sw1 and sw2 are given by: 
1
1 2
1 1 2
1 20
1 1b b
p pd dz
q q
θ −= − = − −∫          ….. (13) 
1 1
1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 20 0
21
2 ( 1)b b p b
p p pd dz dz
q q q q
τηθ θ φ
− −= − = +− − +∫ ∫       ….. (14) 
That is, the utility-maximizing demands would be entirely in terms of the other exogenous 
model parameters 1q , 2q , φ , τ  and k  as well as the endogenous 1p , 2p , 1η  and 2η .  Since 
firms need to determine optimal prices to maximize their profits, their problems would be: 
1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 2
max max max
1 p pp d k p k
p p p q q
π η η⎛ ⎞−= − = − −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠    ….. (15) 
1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 2 1 2
max max max 21
2 ( 1)
p p pp d k p k
p p p q q q q
τηπ η ηφ
⎛ ⎞− −= − = + −⎜ ⎟− − +⎝ ⎠
 ….. (16) 
Proposition 26: In a vertically differentiated software market, non-protection would 
always be optimal to the lower-quality firm.  Protection would be optimal for the 
higher-quality firm only if 
2
* 1 1 1 2 2
2
1 1 2
(8 8 )
4( 3 )
q q q q qk k
q q q
τ φ τ φ τ
φ
+ − −< = + − . 
It is apparent that *k  is always increasing in τ , the pirating cost.  Protection would be 
optimal only if the protection cost is below *k  which mainly consists of a square term of the 
pirating cost τ  of the consumer.  This once again suggests that firms should prefer only a 
very simple and low-cost protection mechanism or no protection at all. 
As shown in the Appendix, the optimal prices, demands as well as profits, if non-
protection strategy is adopted by both firms, would be: 
* 1 1 2
1
1 1 2
2 ( )
3
q q qp
q q q
φ
φ
−= + −    
* 1
1
1 1 2
2
3
qd
q q q
φ
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2 2
* 1 1 2
1 2
1 1 2
4 ( )
( 3 )
q q q
q q q
φπ φ
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* 1 1 2 1 2
2
1 1 2
( )( )
3
q q q q qp
q q q
φ
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* 1
2
1 1 23
qd
q q q
φ
φ= + −  
* 1 1 1 2 1 2
2 2
1 1 2
( )( )
( 3 )
q q q q q q
q q q
φ φπ φ
− + −= + −  
                                                 
6 Proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward and withheld due to length limitation.  Interested readers may obtain it from the 
authors directly. 
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In particular, the higher-quality firm would charge a higher price and the optimal profit of the 
higher-quality firm is increasing in 1q  just like the case of horizontal differentiation.  The 
optimal profit of the lower-quality firm is also increasing in φ .  In case the higher-quality 
firm chooses to protect, the optimal prices, demands as well as profits of the two firms would 
become: 
* 1 1 2
1
1 1 2
(4 )( )
2( 3 )
q q qp
q q q
φ τ
φ
+ −= + −   
* 1
1
1 1 2
41
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Similar to the case of horizontal differentiation, it can be shown that the optimal 
prices and demands for non-protection would always be lower than those if the higher quality 
firm chooses to protect.  Again, the protection cost should be the major determining factor for 
the higher quality firm to choose protection.  The effects of risk on the optimal price, demand 
as well as profit can be seen from the following table of comparative statics: 
 *
1p
φ
∂
∂  
*
2p
φ
∂
∂  
*
1d
φ
∂
∂  
*
2d
φ
∂
∂  
*
1π
φ
∂
∂  
*
2π
φ
∂
∂  
Only Firm 1 Protect ′′+  ′′+  ′′+  ′′−  ′′+  ′′+  
Both Not Protect +  +  +  +  +  +  
1 24( ): positive if 
3
q qτ −′′+ <    1 24( ): negative if 
3
q qτ −′′− <  
Namely, optimal prices, demands and profits would all increase with risk if both firms choose 
the non-protection strategy.  In case the higher quality firm chooses to protect, the optimal 
prices and profits would still increase with risk7 but the optimal demand for the lower quality 
product would decrease.  Intuitively, a higher risk would lead to a higher demand for the 
higher quality product but that would essentially reduce the demand of the lower quality 
product, although it would still result in an increased profit for the lower quality firm due to 
the increased price. 
 
5. Discussion 
We have considered the optimal protection strategies under two different types of 
market differentiations.  Our analysis shows that in a vertically differentiated market the 
lower-quality firm would always prefer non-protection. Furthermore, protection would be 
                                                 
7 We mainly consider the case when 1 2(4/3)( )q qτ < −  because the pirating cost should be significantly lower than the 
benefits of software in order for people to consider pirating. 
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profit-maximizing only if the implementation cost is low.  In reality, we observe that most 
software developers are still implementing some sort of protection mechanisms in their 
software products although strong externalities effects are quite universal in the widely-
expanded software business nowadays.  Apparently this seems to be inconsistent with the 
findings from previous researches (Conner & Rumelt 1991; Shy & Thisse 1999).  It is also 
interesting to note that complicated protection mechanisms are seldom found nowadays.  
Most software products just employ a simple product key code validation or registration 
process to guard against unauthorized usage.  The duplicated uses of those product key codes 
are seldom really checked, nor would they prevent the actual usage of the software.  The 
software protection mechanisms used nowadays are observed to be converging to a very 
simple and common form of product key code validation.  It is reasonable to expect that this 
sort of mechanisms would not be very costly to implement and is likely to be reusable on 
other software products developed by the same firm, further lowering the average 
implementation cost of protection. 
Anecdotal evidence supports some of our findings.  For instance, Maplesoft’s Maple 
and Wolfram’s Mathematica can be regarded as two horizontally differentiated products 
competing in the area of symbolic computation software. They are two incompatible products 
with different sets of features and employ different file formats although their problem 
domains are similar. Both of them adopt a simple product key code validation mechanism for 
protection.  It is interesting to find that apart from protection strategy, their listed prices are 
also very similar.  These facts are consistent with our analytical findings. 
On the other hand, the Microsoft Office suite and Sun Microsystems’ StarOffice 
package can be regarded as examples of vertically differentiated products.  As Microsoft 
Office has become a de facto standard in the office productivity area, competitors in this 
application area have to develop products that are compatible with it.  Unfortunately, 
Microsoft Office has been adopting a proprietary file format that prevents others from 
producing compatible products. StarOffice actually originated from an open- source initiative 
that attempted to reverse-engineer the proprietary file formats used by Microsoft Office that 
was believed to be over-priced.  As a result, StarOffice is able to read and produce documents 
and spreadsheets in Microsoft Office format.  However, it never achieves full compatibility 
with Microsoft Office and users may perceive it as a lower-quality product in this sense.  
Interestingly, Microsoft Office is adopting a protection scheme while StarOffice is not.  
Again, this is consistent with our analytical findings. 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
Our findings show that the primary consideration of software protection strategies 
should be the implementation cost.  This may help explain why complicated protection 
mechanisms have mostly been driven out of the software market nowadays.  Also, the 
software developer of the lower-quality product would tend to adopt non-protection in order 
to compete with the higher-quality product in a vertically differentiated market.  We have 
also considered the effects of risk in using pirated software.  In either horizontally 
differentiated or vertically differentiated markets, a firm’s profit is found to be increasing 
with the risk of using pirated software8.  More interestingly, one may find that risk has a 
similar positive effect on profit as product quality.  
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the existence of risk in itself does not 
prevent the use of pirated software.  However, consumers are deterred from doing so in view 
                                                 
8 If protection is chosen, this is subject to some technical constraints regarding the pirating cost τ. 
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of the uncertainty introduced by the risk. Gopal & Sanders (1997) showed that deterrent 
measures would be more profit-maximizing than preventive ones for dealing with software 
piracy.  Our findings about the effect of risk also support this argument.  We attribute one of 
the sources of the risk in using pirated software to the unavailability of technical support.  
However, it should be noted that in this study we do not assume risk to be a parameter 
controllable by firm.  In real life, the risk in using pirated software is subject to many other 
factors beyond the control of the software firm.  We believe that firms can actually affect at 
least two factors: the reliability of software product and the quality of technical support.  
Ironically, the value of technical support increases when the reliability of software decreases.  
It would be interesting to see how these two factors (i.e. reliability and technical support 
quality) would interact and affect the firm’s optimal strategy.  We believe that future 
extension of this study can be developed along this line. 
Our analysis does not consider the effect of externalities.  Intuitively, firms should 
merely have less incentive to protect their software if there are strong externalities effects.  
However, empirical observation shows that most software products are still implementing 
protection mechanisms, albeit only simple and low-cost ones.  In this study, we mainly focus 
on the effects of protection costs and risk in a competitive market.  It would actually be 
straightforward to extend our model to include externalities effects as well.  This could be 
another possible extension of this work. 
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